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It hardly seems that
mitting such evidence in criminal
courts are significantly hindered in their search for the truth by
such rules. And, if exclusion is to continue to be the rule in
criminal cases, there is little logic in not extending it to civil
litigation as well. 5
CHARLES B. ROBSON, JR.

Guardian and Ward-Estate Planning-Gifts by Guardian from
Estate of Incompetent Ward
Petitioner in In re Trusteeship of Kenyan,' as trustee of the person and estate of an incompetent ward, sought authority, pursuant
to legislative enactments, 2 to make gifts from the ward's income;'
to make gifts from the principal of the ward's estate ;4 and, with
regard to an inter vivos trust created by the incompetent, to surrender a reserved right of revocation and to make charitable gifts
of the income therefrom which had been reserved to the incompetent
for her lifetime. 5 On the first appeal,' the lower court orders 7 granting the requested authority were reversed by the North Carolina
Supreme Court on the ground that the lower court's finding that
the incompetent, if competent and heeding sound advice, would
make the gifts was not supported by the evidence. Petitioner, apparently having relied solely on the statutes in his initial pleadings,
was given leave to obtain permission to amend his petitions to al" N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 813-a; N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 12. See People
v. Dinan, 11 N.Y.2d 350, 183 N.E.2d 689, 229 N.Y.S.2d 406, cert. denicd,
371 6U.S. 877 (1962).
With sponsorship of the Bar Association of the City of New York, a
commission to review and make recommendations on all aspects of the antiquated New York divorce laws has been proposed to the 1965 New York
Legislature. Editorial, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1965, p. 38, col. 2. If such a
commission is established, it would be well for it to consider as a part of its
task the evidentiary implications of these laws as they are illustrated by the
Sackler case.
1261 N.C. 1, 134 S.E.2d 85 (1963) ; 262 N.C. 627, 138 S.E.2d 547 (1964).
2
N.C. GEx. STAT. §§ 35-29.1 to -29.16 (Supp. 1963).
' See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-29.1 to -29.4 (Supp. 1963).
'See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-29.5 to -29.10 (Supp. 1963).
' See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-29.11 to -29.16 (Supp. 1963).
'In re Trusteeship of Kenan, 261 N.C. 1, 134 S.E.2d 85 (1963).
Three separate proceedings took place in the superior court-one relating
to gifts from income, another to gifts from principal, and the last to surrendering the right to revoke the trust and the lifetime income interest.
Thus, three orders were issued below, and the proceedings were consolidated for purposes of appeal.
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lege that the authority he sought was something which the incompetent would do, if competent, and to offer evidence to establish the
truth of his allegations. On the second appeal,8 a divided supreme
court found the evidence adequate to support the lower court's
findings of fact that the incompetent would have made the gifts and
affirmed the judgments granting the trustee authority to make them
on her behalf.
The Kenan litigation involves the rule that the estate of an
incompetent may, with the approval of the court having jurisdiction,9
be applied for the benefit of those whom the incompetent probably
would have aided if of sound mind. The rule apparently finds its
first expression in the old leading English case of Ex parte Whitbread.'" There, a niece of the incompetent petitioned for an allowance from the surplus income of the incompetent's estate. In
considering the petition, Lord Eldon set forth the following directive which subsequent cases have pursued: "[Tihe Court, looking
at what it is likely the Lunatic himself would do, if he were in a
capacity to act, will make some provision out of the estate for...
[the applicant].""
This doctrine does not apply, however, to the most frequent class
of applications-those by persons to whom the incompetent owes a
legal duty of support. 12 Thus allowances have been made for husbands, 3 wives,' 4 and minor children 5 of incompetents, not on the
8
In re Trusteeship of Kenan, 262 N.C. 627, 138 S.E.2d 547 (1964).
' In North Carolina jurisdiction over the affairs of incompetents is

vested in the clerks of superior courts. N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§ 33-1 (Supp. 1963).

Mer. 99, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Ch. 1816). A reporter's note to EX parte
Whitbread refers to the earlier case of In re Cotton, but this case is apparently unreported. See Thompson & Hale, The Surplus Income of a
Lunatic,
8 HA.v. L. REv. 472, 474 (1895).
112 Mer. at 102, 35 Eng. Rep. at 879.
" The allowance to provide support for dependents of the incompetent
person does not involve the so-called doctrine of substitution of judgment. That doctrine is called into being, in those jurisdictions wherein
it is recognized, when the court is asked to make an allowance out of the
incompetent's estate to persons for whom he is not bound to provide.
It re Beilstein, 145 Ohio St. 397, 404, 62 N.E.2d 205, 208 (1945) (concurring opinion).
In re DeNisson, 197 Wash. 265, 84 P.2d 1024 (1938) (husband
indigent; family expenses chargeable against husband or wife); Edwards
v. Abrey, 2 Phill. Ch. 37, 41 Eng. Rep. 855 (1846) (surplus after maintaining incompetent wife to be paid to husband).
Hallett v.
1" Booth v. Cottingham, 126 Ind. 431, 26 N.E. 84 (1891);
Hallett, 8 Ind. App. 305, 34 N.E. 740 (1893); Tiffany v. Worthington, 96
Iowa 560, 65 N.W. 817 (1896); Thomasson v. Thomasson, 310 Ky. 234,
102
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theory that the incompetent would have provided for them if sane,
but because his disability does not alter the incompetent's legal duty
to support his family, if able."0 Where the applicant is an adult
child, however, rather rigid adherence to requiring a finding that
the incompetent himself would have made the gift has prevailed.17
Exceptions to this requirement have been made where the adult
child was incapacitated and unable to provide for himself.', In
cases involving adopted children'" and stepchildren20 a finding that
the incompetent would have made the gift has likewise been required, though courts have allowed grants for illegitimate children
without specifying that the requirement be met.2 '
Allowances from the incompetent's estate have not been limited
to members of his immediate family, however, and it is in making
219 S.W.2d 957 (1949); Pearl v. McDowell, 26 Ky. 658 (1830); In re
Leech, 45 La. Ann. 194, 12 So. 126 (1893); In re Stewart, 22 At. 122
(N.J. Eq. 1891); It re Wilder, 174 Misc. 244, 20 N.Y.S.2d 69 (Sup. Ct.
1940); In re Taylor, 9 Paige 611 (N.Y. 1842); Snowdon v. ScrantonLackawanna Trust Co., 46 Pa. D. & C. 418 (C.P. 1942) (wife's funeral expenses); In re Miegocki, 34 Luzerne Leg. Reg. Rep. 257 (Pa. C.P. 1940).
" Goskins v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 30 Cal. App. 2d 409, 86 P.2d
681 (1939); Brackett v. Glaze, 72 Ga. App. 314, 33 S.E.2d 733 (1945);
Hallett v. Hallett, supra note 14; It re Leech, supranote 14; Marsh v. Scott,
63 A.2d 275 (N.J. Super. 1949) ; In re Wilder, supra note 14; Cartwright v.
Juvenile Court, 172 Tenn. 626, 113 S.W.2d 754 (1938); Foster v. Marchant,
1 Vern. 263, 23 Eng. Rep. 457 (Ch. 1684).
10 Where the incompetent father's entire estate consisted of a railroad
relief pension, all of which was required for the father's needs, the court
exercised its discretion to deny an allowance for the support and education
of the father's minor child. It re Henderson, 45 Pa. D. & C. 359 (C.P.
1942). See also Dutch v. Marvin, 72 Iowa 663, 34 N.W. 465 (1887); In re
Bell, 56 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Sedar's Estate, 29 Pa. D. & C.
680 (C.P. 1937); Ex parte Weinrich, 20 Pa. Dist. 1070 (C.P. 1910).
"1in re Schwartz, 27 Del. Ch. 223, 34 A.2d 275 (Ch. 1943); Citizens
State Bank v. Shanklin, 174 Mo. App. 639, 161 S.W. 341 (1913); In re
Beilstein, 145 Ohio St. 397, 62 N.E.2d 205 (1945); In re Hare, 26 Pa.
D. & C. 553 (C.P. 1935); Farmer v. Farmer, 78 Tenn. 309 (1882) (requisite
intent found).
re
yi Hall, 19 Ill. App. 295 (1885) ; Sheneman v. Manring, 152 Kan.
780, 107 P.2d 741 (1940); Paglia's Estate, 25 Pa. D. & C. 316 (C.P. 1936)
(burial expenses of tubercular daughter paid from incompetent mother's
estate). It can be argued that this is not an exception to the rule at all,
but rather that these are regarded as circumstances under which the incompetent would make the allowance.
re Heeney, 2 Barb. Ch. 326 (N.Y. 1847).
yi
"°In re Willoughby, 11 Paige 257 (N.Y. Ch. 1844).
"Halsey's Appeal, 120 Pa. 209, 13 At]. 934 (1888) ; Ex parte Haycock,
5 Russ. Ch. 154, 38 Eng. Rep. 985 (1828). "What if this family was illegitimate? The children, at least, were those of Siegfried, and could not
be turned out to starve just because they were bastards." Halsey's Appeal,
supra at 214, 13 Atl. at 936.
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grants to others that the Whitbread doctrine is most often ap23
plied. 2 Courts have made allowances to the incompetent's parents,
grandchildren2 4 brothers and sisters, 5 brothers and sisters of the
half blood,2 6 nieces and nephews,2" and cousins.2 s While these rela" The difficulty I have had was as to the extent of relationship to which
an allowance ought to be granted. I have found instances in which the
Court has, in its allowances to the relations of the Lunatic, gone to a

farther distance than grand-children-to brothers and other collateral
kindred; and if we get to the principle, we find that it is not because the
parties are next of kin of the Lunatic, or, as such, have any right to
an allowance, but because the Court will not refuse to do, for the benefit
of the Lunatic, that which it is probable the Lunatic himself would have
done.
Ex parte Whitbread, 2 Mer. 99, 103, 35 Eng. Rep. 878, 879 (Ch. 1816).
Where the Whitbread doctrine has been rejected, it has generally been
on the ground that the state statute governing the powers of the court over
the property of an incompetent was restrictive and did not permit a general
application of the rule. See, e.g., Kelly v. Scott, 215 Md. 530, 137 A.2d 704
(1957); Binney v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 43 R.I. 222, 110 Atl. 615
(1920); Lewis v. Moody, 149 Tenn. 687, 261 S.W. 673 (1923).
"' Gamble v. Leva, 212 Ala. 155, 102 So. 120 (1924); Ex parte Phillips,
130 Miss. 682, 94 So. 840 (1923); State ex rel. Kemp v. Arnold, 234 Mo.
App. 154, 113 S.W.2d 143 (1938); O'Connor's Estate, 6 Pa. D. & C. 789
(C. P. 1925); It re Bala, 36 Luzerne Leg. Reg. Rep. 268 (Pa. C.P. 1941)
(for mother's funeral); Seley v. Howell, 115 Tex. 583, 285 S.W. 815 (1926) ;
Tn re Strozyk, 156 Wash. 233, 286 Pac. 646 (1930) (for expenses while
visiting incompetent). Allowances for parents were denied in Lewis v.
Koody, 149 Tenn. 687, 261 S.W. 673 (1923) (not within statute); In re
leck, 225 Wis. 636, 275 N.W. 520 (1937) (not within statute); and In re
Booth, 22 L.T.R. 249 (Eq. 1854) (no allowance for past maintenance).
One English case granted an allowance for a monument which the lunatic
had contracted to have erected to his grandmother. In re Dyce Sombre, 10
L.T.R. 362 (Eq. 1848).
"In re Schley, 107 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
" Farwell v. Commissioner, 38 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1930) ; In re Buckley's
Estate, 330 Mich. 102, 47 N.W.2d 33 (1951); In re Carson, 39 Misc. 2d
544, 241 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1962); In re Battin, 171 Misc. 145, 11
N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sup. Ct. 1939); In re Calasantra, 154 Misc. 493, 278 N.Y.
Supp. 263 (Chautauqua County Ct. 1935); In re Gilbert, 3 Abb. N. Cas. 222
(N.Y. 1876); It re Heeney, 2 Barb. Ch. 326 (N.Y. 1847). Allowances for
brothers or sisters were denied in Stephens v. Marshall, 23 Hun 641 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1881) ; Monds v. Dugger, 144 S.W.2d 761 (Tenn. 1940) ; and In re
Clark, 2 Phill. Ch. 292, 41 Eng. Rep. 951 (Ch. 1847).
So, where a large property devolves upon an elder son, who is a
Lunatic, as heir at law, and his brothers and sisters are slenderly or not
at all provided for, the Court will make an allowance to the latter for
the sake of the former; upon the principle that it would naturally be
more agreeable to the lunatic, and more for his advantage, that they
should receive an education and maintenance suitable to his condition,
than that they should be sent into the world to disgrace him as beggars.
Ex parte Whitbread, 2 Mer. 99, 102, 35 Eng. Rep. 878, 879 (Ch. 1816).
" In re Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 181 App. Div. 642, 168 N.Y. Supp.
952 (1918), aff'd per curiam, 225 N.Y. 666, 122 N.E. 880 (1919).
" In re Brice's Guardianship, 233 Iowa 183, 8 N.W.2d 576 (1943) ; In re
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tives have been the most frequent beneficiaries, they have not been
the only ones. Grants have been made to elderly persons whom the
incompetent formerly had supported,29 to a retired servant,80 and
to a former paramour." And, though sometimes limited to those
which the incompetent had been in the habit of making, 2 charitable
gifts have also been allowed.88
While the general posture of the case law is undoubtedly to
the effect that the court will do for the incompetent what it finds
the incompetent himself would have done, 4 the rule probably
should have been that the court will do what it would have been
wise and prudent for the incompetent to have done.8" At first blush
the language of Ex parte Whitbread seems to indicate that the
former is the rule, for the case says the court looks at "what it
is likely the Lunatic himself would do, if he were in a capacity
to act .... -"" But closer scrutiny indicates otherwise, for it also
Ginsberg, 267 App. Div. 995, 48 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1944); In re Fleming,
173 Misc. 851, 19 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Ihre Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co., supra note 26; Hambleton's Appeal, 102 Pa. 50 (1883); In re
Creagh, 1 Drury & Wal. 323 (1888); In re Sparrow, L.R. 20 Ch. 320
(1882); lit re Blair, 1 Myl. & C. 300, 40 Eng. Rep. 390 (Ch. 1836). An
allowance was denied when the incompetent's nephew wanted it for the
purpose of augmenting an idle and luxurious life. In re Kernochan, 84 Misc.
565, 146 N.Y. Supp. 1026 (Sup. Ct. 1914). See also In re Johnson, 111
N.J. Eq. 268, 162 AtI. 96 (1932); Lewis v. Moody, 149 Tenn. 687, 261
S.W. 673 (1923).
" In re Flagler, 248 N.Y. 415, 162 N.E. 471 (1928) ; In re Darling, 39
Ch. D. 208 (1888); In re Frost, L.R. 5 Ch. 699 (1870). Where the incompetent had not even known of the existence of a cousin in distressing
circumstances, and no grounds existed for inferring an intention to aid him,
the application was denied. In re Evans, 21 Ch. D. 297 (1882). See also
Fixico v. Ming, 176 Okla. 358, 55 P.2d 1027 (1936).
" In re Heeney, 2 Barb. Ch. 326 (N.Y. 1847).
"oIn re the Earl of Carysfort, Craig & Ph. 76, 41 Eng. Rep. 418 (Ch.
1840).
31
In re Parry, 7 L.T.R. 77 (Eq. 1846).
"lit re Heeney, 2 Barb. Ch. 326 (N.Y. 1847).
" See In re Hall's Guardianship, 31 Cal. 2d 157, 187 P.2d 396 (1947);
In re Brice's Guardianship, 233 Iowa 183, 8 N.W.2d 576 (1943); Citizens
State Bank v. Shanklin, 174 Mo. App. 639, 161 S.W. 341 (1913); In re
Heeney, supra note 32; In re Strickland, L.R. 6 Ch. 226 (1871).
" See, e.g., In re Brice's Guardianship, supra note 33; Ford v. Security
Nat'l Bank, 249 N.C. 141, 105 S.E.2d 421 (1958); It re the Earl of Carysfort, Craig & Ph. 76, 41 Eng. Rep. 418 (Ch. 1840). "The controlling
principle is that the court will act with reference to the incompetent and
for his benefit as he would probably have acted if sane." In re Brice's
Guardianship, supra note 33 at 189, 8 N.W.2d at 580.
" See Thompson & Hale, supra note 10, at 473-74, 479-80; Note, 9 VILL.
L. Rxv. 522 (1964).
" 2 Mer. at 102, 35 Eng. Rep. at 879.
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says that "what ... would be beneficial to ... [the lunatic] should
be done"'3 7 and that the court should apply the property as it thinks
"it would have been wise and prudent in the Lunatic himself to apply it."38 To allow the guardian to do for the lunatic what would be
wise for the lunatic himself to do is certainly more consonant with
the universal duty of the guardian to manage the ward's estate
prudently.3 9 Thus, it seems that in applying the Whitbread doctrine
the courts often have imposed a burden upon the guardian which
that opinion never envisaged 0 and one which may conflict with the
normal obligations of guardianship.
Although the Whitbread doctrine was recognized in North
Carolina in an early case,41 the court there indicated a disinclination to follow it. A rule that the dependents of an incompetent
would be provided for before creditors or others could share in
his estate became well established in North Carolina,42 but the court
indicated that it would not extend the bounty to collateral relations and married children of the lunatic. 43 Statutes 44 passed in
1854, however, in effect provided for a limited application of the
Whitbread doctrine by allowing advancements from surplus income
to be made to designated relatives of the incompetent. In a recent
case,45 where the applicants were adult children of the incompetent
whom the court could not have aided under the old North Carolina
view,46 the court expressed its interpretation of the statutes in language reminiscent of Whitbread: "If their father were mentally
Ibid.
Id. at 103, 35 Eng. Rep. at 879.
See Fratcher, Powers and Dtties of Guardiansof Property, 45 IowA
L. REv. 264 (1960). "A guardian of property has power and, ordinarily, a
duty to collect and take possession of the assets of his ward including land
and personal property, manage them prudently, and protect them from deterioration or loss." Id. at 292, 294 (citing statutes and cases from numerous
jurisdictions).
,OFor a more thorough critique, see Note, 9 VILL. L. REv. 522 (1964).
'1 Brooks v. Brooks, 25 N.C. 389 (1843).
2Read v. Turner, 200 N.C. 773, 158 S.E. 475 (1931) ; Lemley v. Ellis,
146 N.C. 221, 59 S.E. 683 (1907) ; In re Hybart, 119 N.C. 359, 25 S.E. 963
(1896); Adams v. Thomas, 81 N.C. 296 (1879); In re Latham, 39 N.C. 231
(1846).
, Brooks v. Brooks, 25 N.C. 389, 391 (1843).
" N.C. GEzr. STAT. §§ 35-20 to -29 (1950).
" Ford v. Security Nat'l Bank, 249 N.C. 141, 105 S.E.2d 421 (1958).
" "[O]ur courts may not be authorized to extend the allowance ... to
advancements to married children, as is done in England." Brooks v.
Brooks, 25 N.C. 389, 391 (1843).
27
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competent, would he not aid them? If so, the court has the authority to use his money for that purpose." '
The Kenan litigation represents a response to further statutory
developments in North Carolina, designed to authorize charitable
gifts for estate planning purposes rather than to aid individual
beneficiaries. Statutes passed by the 1963 General Assembly specifically authorized the guardian or trustee of an incompetent, under
specified circumstances and with the approval of the resident judge
of the superior court, to make gifts from income' or principal4
for religious, charitable, educational, and other purposes, and to
surrender the right to revoke a trust created by the incompetent and
make a gift of the reserved life estate. 0 Although the statutes do
not contain the old requirement that the court, before authorizing
the gifts, must find that the incompetent, if sane, would have made
them, on the first appeal of the instant case51 the supreme court insisted that this requirement must be met. 2 The majority thought
that to authorize the gifts merely because the guardian and the court
believed they should be made, though it was not what the lunatic
had done or would have done, would amount to a taking of property
in derogation of the lunatic's constitutional rights. 3 A pungent
dissent argued that the only taking was of the right of the trustee
to do with the estate what the General Assembly had authorized
him to do. 4
""Ford v. Security Nat'l Bank, 249 N.C. 141, 144, 105 S.E.2d 421, 424

(1958).

,8 N.C.

GEN. STAT.
STAT.
STAT.

N.C. GEN.
"0
N.C. GEN.
5
'8

§§ 35-29.1 to -29.4 (Supp. 1963).
§§ 35-29.5 to -29.10 (Supp. 1963).
§§ 35-29.11 to -29.16 (Supp. 1963).

In re Trusteeship of Kenan, 261 N.C. 1, 134 S.E.2d 85 (1963).
"A court may authorize a fiduciary to make a gift of a part of the estate
of an incompetent only on a finding, on a preponderance of the evidence, at a
hearing of which interested parties have notice, that the lunatic, if then of
sound mind, would make the gift." Id. at 9, 134 S.E.2d at 91.
53Id. at 9, 134 S.E.2d
at 91.
"The plantive language of Justice Higgins's closing paragraphs merits
quotation:
The trustee seeks to follow . . . sound business practices, but the

Court says this is taking private property. To my single-track mind the
only thing taken is the right of the trustee, acting for his beneficiary, to
do with this vast estate what the General Assembly of North Carolina
authorized him to do. The relatives in this public spirited family who
are sui Juris appear to have joined in the trustee's requests. The authority
to follow the plan has been authorized by 170 of the people's representatives in session on Halifax street. It is now set aside by a majority of the
seven on Morgan.
This decision will haunt us. I vote to affirm.
Id. at 17, 134 S.E.2d at 97.
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Because the court required a finding as to what the incompetent
would have done, the entire thrust of the case on remand 55 was
toward establishing that the incompetent, if competent, would have
made the gifts. Confronted with persuasive evidence presented in
the trial court on both sides, the supreme court again divided. A
majority found sufficient basis upon which to affirm the order
granting the petition in a showing that: (1) it was wise and prudent
to make the gifts; (2) the action was consistent with the trustee's
powers and duties under the North Carolina statutes; (3) the
natural objects of the incompetent's bounty would recommend to her
that she take the action; (4) her trustee would explain the facts
to her, if she were competent, and recommend that she make the
gifts; (5) others of her kin would so recommend; (6) several tax
and estate planning experts would advise her to take the action;
and (7) her brother, whose advice she had always taken on business
matters, would have advised her to make the gifts, and he believed
she would have followed his advice. Equally convincing, however,
are the factors compelling the dissent, viz.: (1) the incompetent's
charitable gifts for the eight years prior to declaration of incompetency had amounted to only 8,160 dollars annually; (2) the
largest single donation the incompetent had ever made was 25,000
dollars, though she was often solicited for much larger contributions; (3) there was no evidence she had ever considered donating
to several of the institutions to which gifts were now recommended;
(4) the incompetent had provided for certain charities in her will,
thus showing those causes to which she wished to contribute and
the amounts; (5) her will provided that anyone contesting or trying to change its provisions in any way would forfeit his interest
thereunder; and (6) the incompetent had taken no steps toward
making large charitable gifts, although she was, in the dissenting
judge's opinion, fully aware of the impact of taxes, and also aware
that donations to charity would mean an actual outlay of only a
small portion of the gifts. 5'
" See the report of the second appeal, In re Trusteeship of Kenan, 262
N.C. 627, 138 S.E.2d 547 (1964).
" The dissenting judge seems to base this statement on the notion that a
"financial expert and long-time friend" had informed her regarding these
matters. The testimony of this "expert" indicates otherwise. See Record,
vol. 1, pp. 237-47, especially pp. 239-42, In re Trusteeship of Kenan, 262
N.C. 627, 138 S.E.2d 547 (1964). The following statement seems emphatically
to discredit such a notion:
I did not advise Mrs. IKenan in matters relating to estate planning,
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When the evidence in Kenan that the incompetent would have
made the gifts is contrasted to that in In re duPont,57 a recent
case in point, its tenuousness is accentuated. In duPont, the proposed distributees were also the takers under the incompetent's
will,"' and the gifts thus would in no way alter the incompetent's
testamentary scheme apart from acceleration. 0 The incompetent
was a businessman of great experience and responsibility, was
sophisticated in the ways of taxation, and had previously made large
gifts to members of his family."0 Even more important, the incompetent had stated by letter after executing his will his intention
to dispose of his property by lifetime gifts so as to reduce his estate
to a stated amount.61 Other documents indicated his concern for the
most advantageous distribution and his apparent knowledge of the
tax considerations involved. 2 Thus, there were not only acts and
circumstances meriting inference of an intent to make the gifts,
but also the incompetent's written declaration of his express resolu63
tion so to do.
Seldom indeed, however, will there be evidence so favorable as
that in duPont, and to make allowances on evidence no greater than
that in Kenan is not unprecedented. In City Bank Farmers Trust
Co. v. McGowan6 4 substantial gifts had been allowed to a daughter,
nor did I advise her in matters relating to the disposition of her property
by Will or by gift. Estate planning was not a part of my duties, and I
have never held myself out to be an estate planner to Mrs. Kenan or to
anyone else.
Record, vol. 1, p. 240.
" 194 A.2d 309 (Del. Ch. 1963) ; 52 CALIF. L. Rxv. 192 (1964) ; 24 MD.
L. Rrv. 332 (1964); 62 MicH. L. Rxv. 1471 (1964); 112 U. PA. L. Rv.
1083 (1964).
8194 A.2d at 310.
"oIn Kenan, by contrast, the vast majority of the proffered distributees
were completely omitted from the terms of the will.
194 A.2d at 311.
Ibid.
Ibid.

"The only unfavorable circumstance was that the incompetent never
executed his proposed plan. The court thought it a reasonable inference,
however, that he deferred the making of the gifts because of the DuPontGeneral Motors anti-trust action which was pending from 1949 to 1962.
To have made the gifts might have been to lend support to the government's
contention that the incompetent and others had pursued a course of conduct
designed to keep control of the DuPont Company in the family. Id. at 312.
" 43 F. Supp. 790 (W.D.N.Y. 1942), aft'd, 142 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1944),
inodified, 323 U.S. 594 (1945). See also City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v.
Hoey, 23 F. Supp. 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1938). The cited cases are tax cases
arising from New York Supreme Court proceedings of January 14, 1927,
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to grandchildren, and to collateral heirs of the incompetent. Aside
from an annual pittance to one, the incompetent had never made
nor indicated any intention to make sizable allowances for the benefit of the collateral relatives or the grandchildren.6" While she had
made annual allowances to her daughters, the gifts authorized
by the court far exceeded any the incompetent had ever made. 6 No
need sufficient to prompt an altered pattern of giving by the incompetent was shown on behalf of any of the applicants. 67 In short,
so deficient were data indicating that the incompetent would have
made the gifts, that Judge Learned Hand concluded that the incompetent would have so acted only with the prospect of imminent
incompetency before her, for
the judges had no evidence whatever from her past conduct for
supposing that.., she would have given away every year to her
daughter, her grandchildren and her brother and sisters, more
than $160,000 out of the $250,000 which remained to her after
paying her taxes and expenses. The allowances she68had theretofore made did not remotely approach such figures.
In Kenan, as in the duPont and City Bank Farmers Trust Co.
cases, the object of making the gifts was not to meet any needs of
the applicants, but solely to effectuate a sound estate plan. Reduction of the incompetent's taxable estate and a concomitant increase
in the amount available for the ultimate distributees was the common purpose. While the greatest savings ensue if the gifts escape
the estate tax and are taxed solely under the usually lower rates
of the gift tax, 9 substantial savings will nonetheless result even if
the gifts should be held to have been made in contemplation of
death 70 and their amount restored to the gross estate for estate
tax purposes. In such a case the gift tax paid is available as a
credit against the estate tax,71 and more importantly, the amount of
and June 3, 1932, involving gifts from the estate of an incompetent ward.
The facts before the state court are adequately set forth in the reports of the
tax cases, and the discussion here is based thereon.
" 43 F. Supp. at 794.
0"Ibid.
oIbid.

68 City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. McGowan, 142 F.2d 599, 601 (1944).
(Emphasis added.)
"Cf.
INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2011, 2502.
70
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2035.
1
' INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2012.
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As a result,
the gift tax is not itself restored to the gross
the making of the gifts would occasion a minimal savings of sixteen
million dollars in duPont7" and over four and one half million
dollars in the proceeding regarding the trust in Kenan.74
While the holding on the second appeal in Kenan made possible
execution of the proffered estate plan, the first appeal leaves the
law of North Carolina in an untenable state. To persist in requiring
a finding that the incompetent himself would have made the gifts
is to deny that sound estate planning is in itself sufficient reason to
authorize the guardian to act. 75 Such tenacity seems inconsistent

with the original requirements of Ex parte Whitbread"0 and defies
sound policy and reasoning. The guardian is charged with managing the assets of his ward prudently and protecting them from deterioration and loss. 77 By refusing to allow him to do for the ward

what any reasonable man of property would do for himself, i.e.,
plan his estate, the court frustrates the guardian's attempt to perform this duty. Indeed, absent the finding that the ward would have
so acted, it positively insures his failure.
Moreover, in many cases, if not most, it will be quite impossible
for the court to divine just what the incompetent, when confronted
with extant tax laws, would do. The question thus becomes largely
one of policy, of deciding whether or not to do for the incompetent
' See Record, vol. 1, p. 317, In re Trusteeship of Kenan, 262 N.C. 627,

138 S.E.2d 547 (1964).

194 A.2d at 311.
"' See Brief for Appellee, pp. 36-38, It re Trusteeship of Kenan, 262
N.C. 627, 138 S.E.2d 547 (1964) ; Record, vol. 2, pp. 314-17.
"A Pennsylvania court has held that tax avoidance is not a sufficient
motive to justify distributing the incompetent's assets before his death.
Bullock Estate, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 682 (Orphans' Ct. 1957). But a New
York court has held that to make distributions for the purpose of saving
taxes and administration expenses is within the broad equity powers of the
court. In re Carson, 241 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
Such conclusion is fortified not alone by the savings which can be
effected but by the further consideration that to do otherwise would
result in a loss to the two principal objects of the decedent's bounty and
a gain only to the executors in the form of increased commissions and
the respective federal and state governments in the form of increased
taxes.
To do otherwise would lead to a result increasing estate costs to a
point hardly consistent with our modern concept of estate planning for
tax and other legitimate estate benefits.
Id. at 290.
78 See text accompanying notes 34-40 supra.
, Fratcher, Powers and Ditties of Guardians of Property, 45 IowA L.
Ray. 264, 292-94 (1960). See also Note, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 192, 194 (1964).
7
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NOTES AND COMMENTS

that which the best interest of his estate dictates. In such circumstances no good reason exists for not resolving the inquiry in favor
of a statutory interpretation allowing the soundest estate planning.
Indeed, this is but to pursue the familiar legal standard of "the
reasonably prudent man under the circumstances," and some courts
have based distributions on this theory.78 Supporting argument can
be made that there is a pervasive tax avoidance motive in all persons
of property79 and that such may readily be imputed to the incompetent. Indeed, to presume otherwise is to impute a preference that
one's property go to the government rather than to the natural or
declared objects of his bounty-an unlikely predilection at bestand to effect a blatant discrimination against the heirs of incompetents. It thus seems the sounder policy to allow guardians wide
discretion in planning their wards' estates, especially where, as in
Kenan, there has been a finding that the ward will never recover
competency 8 0
To allow such discretion within prescribed bounds seems precisely what the North Carolina legislature has attempted to do.
The 1963 statutes" are so designed as to be applicable only to fortunes sufficiently substantial that estate planning is indispensable to
their preservation. Moreover, the permission to make gifts is so
circumscribed by conditions precedent that not only is harm to the
estate highly unlikely, but benefit is virtually assured. Conjecture
is inevitably involved in the common law approach of finding what
the incompetent would have done under the circumstances. The
statutory pattern, by contrast, posits an objective standard. When
the prescribed conditions are met, legislative purpose as well as sound
policy seems to demand a presumption that the incompetent would
then have made the gifts. Precedent for such a construction may be
found in the intestacy statutes, 2 which are presumed to reflect the
wishes of a decedent who has left no will, no finding of actual intent
being required. By reinvoking the requirement of finding what the
" E.g., Potter v. Berry, 53 N.J. Eq. 151, 32 At. 259 (Ct. Err. & App.

1895); In re Bond, 198 Misc. 256, 98 N.Y.S.2d 81 (Sup. Ct. 1950); In re
Fleming's Estate, 173 Misc. 851, 19 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Hambleton's Appeal, 102 Pa. 50 (1883); Ex parte Whitbread, 2 Mer. 99, 35 Eng.
Rep. 878 (Ch. 1816).
"

See Note, 52

CALIF.

L. REv. 192, 196 (1964).

" In re Trusteeship of Kenan, 261 N.C. 1, 6-7, 134 S.E.2d 85, 89 (1963).
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-29.1 to -29.16 (Supp. 1963).
'2 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-1 to -30 (Supp. 1961).
a
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incompetent would have done, the court seems to have modified the
legislative intent as well as to have rejected the sounder policy approach.
WILLIS PADGETT WHICHARD

Practice and Procedure-Review of Order Remanding to State Court
-Tactical Windfall Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 institutes a procedure unique in present trial practice. 2 When a case, removed to
the United States district court under section 1443 of title 28, is
ordered remanded to the state court, that order may now be reviewed "by appeal or otherwise." 3 This amendment of the former
rule exempting all orders to remand from review makes it possible
for the defendant who alleges that a question of civil rights is involved to delay trial on the merits until the whole arsenal of federal review weapons has been exhausted. Extensive use of this
delaying tactic may lead to a narrowing of the scope of review of
these remand orders by legislative action or judicial interpretation.4
178 Stat. 266, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(d) (Supp. 1964).

'Unique

as a practical matter; the United States may appeal from an
order of remand in cases relating to lands of the five Civilized Tribes of
Oklahoma. Act of Aug. 4, 1947, ch. 458, § 3(c), 61 Stat. 732. Professor
Moore calls this a "minor statutory exception." IA MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.169 [2.-1], at 1452 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as MOORE]. The
description seems appropriate.
'Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 901, 78 Stat. 266, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(d)
(Supp. 1964).
'Textual discussion here will be limited to the practical implications of
section 901; no attempt will be made to justify or condemn it. Congressional
debate on the merits of the amendment is summarized to exemplify the
legislative intent behind the provision:
Experience over a period of eighty years has demonstrated the wisdom of
making the decision of the judge of the U. S. District Court final in removal
proceedings. This amendment would give to the civil rights litigant alone a
right to appeal the remand order. This is an attempt to by-pass the state
and district courts. The removal process is simple, and once the petition is
filed the case is automatically removed. This deprives the state court of all
powers of process and of the power to enter any order while the case is
pending in the federal courts. [But cf. 28 U. S. C. § 1450 (1958).] Allowing appeal from removal orders upsets the delicate balance of power between
the state and federal courts. 110 CONG. REc. 2769 (1964) (remarks of
Representative Tuck).
The first removal statute in the field of civil rights was enacted shortly
after the Civil War for the purpose of giving justice in civil rights cases.

